The Ukrainian Radical National Movement in Inter-War Poland – the Case of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)

In the 19th century, the Ukrainian ethnic territories were divided between the Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Under the Habsburgs rule in Galicia the Ukrainian national movement had more opportunities than in tsarist Russia. At the beginning of 20th century, Galicia was considered a Ukrainian Piedmont, or territory, which in the future could be the basis of an independent state. During and shortly after World War I, efforts can be observed to create an independent and united Ukrainian state („samostija i soborna ukrajins’ka derzhava”). In the territory of the Monarchy, the West Ukrainian People’s Republic (Zachidno-Ukrains’ka Narodna Respublika, ZUNR) was defeated by the Polish Army and Eastern Galicia was incorporated into a newly reborn Polish state. Near the Dnipro river, the Ukrainian People’s Republic (Ukrajins’ka Narodna Respublika, UNR) could not beat back the Bolshevik’s (and the White Russian’s) attack. As a consequence, after World War I, the ethnic Ukrainian territories were divided into four countries (Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania [Bukovina], and Czechoslovakia [Carpatho-Ukraine]). Yet, the main goal of the national movement— to create an independent and sovereign state persisted.

In interwar Poland (1918–1939), the Ukrainian community (approx. 5 million persons, in 1931 16% of country’s population) proved the largest na-

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tional minority. In the early 1920s, the antagonism between the Polish State and the Ukrainian population (mostly in Eastern Galicia where the national as well political and economic consciousness was advanced) remained strong. Ukrainians refused for many years to recognize themselves as subjects of alien ruled.

Of course, the Ukrainian community in Poland was forced to consolidate post-war losses. But in the 1920s, neither the government, nor the Ukrainian parties could work out a program of coexistence, a kind of *modus vivendi*, satisfactory for both sides. The legal sector of the Ukrainian policy in Poland absorbed the largest part of the minority’s life – the representatives of the Ukrainian parties (for example the Ukrajins’ke Natsionalno-Demokratychne Objednannia – UNDO or Ukrajins’ka Sotsial-Demokrattychna Partija-URSP) were working in Parliament in Warsaw. The field of co-operatives movement and culture-education also proved successful (especially the „Prosvita” or „Ridna Hata”).

Aside from the legal aspects of Ukrainian political life, an illegal sector also formed, which did not intended to accept the regime’s political mechanism. This radical national movement rejected Polish rule in Galicia, and worked out a unique form of nationalism; so called “integral nationalism”.

One of the foremost experts on this issue, American historian, John A. Armstrong, defined Ukrainian integral nationalism in the following way: “a belief in the nation supreme value to which all others must be subordinated; glorification of action, war and violence as an expression of superior biological vitality of the nation; and an expression of the „national will” through the charismatic leader and an elite of nationalist enthusiasts organized in a single party.” Another American historian, Alexander J. Motyl added to this list of characteristic features: the exaltation of militarism and imperialism; will and faith as the motive forces of history; rejection of Marxism and communism; totalitarian national ideology and totalitarian political elite.

We can state then, that the Ukrainian national movement was born from the defeat of the Ukrainian revolution in 1917–1921 and the national-liberation fight following World War I. This movement was born out of the pursuit for new political activity among younger generations. Representatives of Ukrainian

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national thought had discovered the impasse of the dominant political orientation at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century (a legalist and non-Marxist socialist orientation). The nationalists did not intend to use conventional methods in their struggle. As the well known, Ukrainian émigré historian, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts’kyj, wrote in his essay on Ukrainian nationalism, “the nationalists believed that the new era requires new revolutionary actions, which could pass the enemy’s test in the matter of ruthlessness and firmness”. On the other side, Ukrainian nationalist historian, Petro Mirchuk’s claimed „Ukrainian nationalism is a spiritual and political movement, which arose from the inner nature of the Ukrainian nation at the time of its violent struggle for the foundation and goals of creative existence”.7

Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973), the spiritual father of the Ukrainian nationalism, was born in Melitopol (near the Black sea), and began his career as a social democratic journalist. The time of the revolution (1917–1918) found him in Kyiv. After the defeat of aspiring Ukrainian independence, he moved to Lviv (Lwow/Lemberg, Poland), where he worked as editor for the „Naukovo-Literaturnyj Vistnyk” („Scientific-Literary Herald”) and „Zahrava” (“Glowing embers”) - both (radical) national oriented.8

Probably the most significant work of the Ukrainian national movement was written and published by Dontsov, in Lviv in 1926, under the simple title: „Natsionalism” („Nationalism”). In this work he did not construct a coherent program, but rather he entered into a controversial debate with humanistic and democratic writers of 19th century (for example with Myhajlo Drahomanov). Regarding this debate, Dontsov pointed out, that only the stronger wins, and the weaker perish in the struggle of nations. He was thus telling Ukrainians to turn away from compromised ideologies (democracy, socialism, and humanism). This short message insisted on a permanent fight for survival.

During the interwar period, Donstov did not join any political party, but his works shaped the thoughts (and actions) of young Ukrainian nationalists, and thus strengthened Ukrainian national consciousness.\(^{10}\)

In the beginning of the 1920’s, the illegal Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrains’ka Vijs’kova Orhanizatsija, UVO), founded by colonel Yevhen Konovalets in 1920 proved the most influential right-wing organization on the Ukrainian political scene in Poland. In fact, UVO was not *sensu stricto* a political party, but – as stressed by Stepan Lenkavs’kyj, an activist of the national movement – the secret army of the Ukrainian state fighting for national rights and independence.\(^{11}\) Members were recruited from Sich Sharpshooters (Sichovi Striltsi), who had fought in World War I on behalf of the Austro-Monarchy’s army against the Russians. The main goal of the organization was to achieve an independent and united Ukrainian state. Their methods, however, differed from those of the legal parties. UVO fighters took up arms against the „Polish occupation” (against administration as well as Polish landowners and colonist) of Eastern Galicia. “Betrayers of the Ukrainian national idea”, persons which collaborated in some way with Polish authorities were also murdered (for example, Sydor Tverdohlib in 1922, who did not want to boycott parliamentary voting in Eastern Galicia).

In the beginning of the 1920’s UVO was very active, with two assassination attempts: Marshall Józef Piłsudski in 1921 and the president of Republic, Stanisław Wojciechowski in 1924. In 1922 alone, 2300 acts of sabotage took place in Eastern Galicia.\(^{12}\) “Expropriations” (attacks against post offices and postmen) provided supplementary operational funds.\(^{13}\)

The Ukrainian national movement’s military wing proved too weak on its own, and elicited foreign supporters. The UVO found this (financial, organizational) support in those states facing political confrontation with Poland (i.e. Germany, Lithuania, and Czechoslovakia).

Among the UVO’s activity, contact with Weimar Germany held a special place. The “Ukrainian question” was not unknown in Berlin: before, and especially during World War I, German politicians and army officers noted the great potential of Ukrainian lands (see Brest-Litovsk peace, or the Pavlo Skoropads’kyj Hetmanate in 1918, supported by the German army). After

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\(^{10}\) Alexander Motyl: The T urn to the Right…, 84–85.


the war, Germany was defeated, and deeply humiliated in the Versailles peace conference. Ukrainian national aspirations were crushed by Poland, which cooperated with Antant states. Logically, cooperation would have benefited both sides. The German authorities were ready to support the biggest national minority in Poland to hinder the consolidation of the „Saison Staat”, and Hofferred support from the Reichswehrministerium (RWM), and especially the intelligence section (Ahwehr-Abteilung, AA). The (limited) German-Ukrainian cooperation was based on pragmatical, and not ideological motives and focused its actions against Poland.  

The real cooperation between UVO and German RWM began in 1923, when the Western Great Powers in the League of Nations, accepted Poland’s Eastern borders. Konovalets hoped that this cooperation would strengthen the UVO local organization, and awaken the interest of influential German circles to the “Ukrainian question”.  

In May 1923, Konovalets and Friedrich Gemp, the chief of RWM AA signed an agreement in which the UVO would carry out intelligence work for Berlin (providing political, military and economic information), while the German side provided financial aid, as well military equipment (weapons and ammunition), for „revolutionary activity”. Between 1924 and 1927, the Ukrainian Military Organization received 9,000 Reichsmark from the German intelligence service. The Germans also supported military training in Eastern Prussia. And, the Free City Danzig (Gdańsk) played an important role as a transit place for money, arms and ammunition. After 1928, when Germany could carry out official intelligence work, its ties with UVO weakened. By the end of the year the Minister of War, Gen. Wilhelm Groener, and chief of AA, Col. Ferdinand von Bredow, ordered to stop to finances supporting the Ukrainian nationalists.  

In 1926, students in Lviv formed national oriented circles. The largest of which, the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (Sojuz Ukrajins’koi

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16 Ibidem, 75–81. The UVO members never denied the cooperation with the German military circles. In their opinion these contacts were not deep nor wide. This cooperation was compared to the alliance between Józef Piłsudski and Polish Military Organization (POW) with German and Austrian authorities against Russia during World War I. Cf. Osyp Boidunnyk: Jak dijshlo do stvorennja Orhanizatsiji Ukrajins’kych Natsionalistiv. In Yevhen Konovalets…., 370–371.
Natsionalnoji Molodi – SUNM) saw any cooperation with legal Ukrainian parties as a “national betrayal”.\(^{17}\) Outside Poland, national groups were organizing, like the Galician officers and soldiers in internment camps in Czechoslovakia who founded the Group of Ukrainian National Youth (Hrupa Ukrajins’koji Natsionalnoji Molodi – HUNM) in 1922. This organization focused on their „own forces” declaring that “the enemy could be not only outside, but also inside the nation”.

Another group was organized in Podebrady in 1925. The League of Ukrainian Nationalists (Liga Ukrajins’kych Natsionalistiv – LUN) overcame the orientation according to which the Ukrainians should seek the inspiration in the Ukrainian history, culture and tradition. Their slogan, “Thoughts are thoughts, but swords are swords”, was so characteristic for the European radical right.\(^{18}\)

In 1926, in Paris, a Soviet agent murdered the head of Ukrainian emigration, the former UNR’s ataman Symon Petlura. During the Shlomo Schwartbard’s trial, it became clear no Western European country seriously (with exception of Germany) took Ukrainian matters seriously. National feelings were whipped up on the 10th anniversary of ZUNR’s takeover in Lviv, in November 1928, with a violent confrontation between the police and hundreds of Ukrainian demonstrators, as well as Polish and Ukrainian students.

In February 1929, a congress brought together the organizationally and geographically sparse Ukrainian national movement’s representatives (UVO, HUNM, LUN, SUNM) during which the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsija Ukrajins’kych Natsionalitiv – OUN) was founded. Col. Konovalets acted as the head of OUN until his death in 1938.\(^{19}\)

The OUN wished to represent the entire Ukrainian nation, and considered a „rightist” organization. Organized in a military and totalitarian structure, OUN leaders declared that their struggle continued against the occupiers (especially Poland) and for an independent state. The organization’s military orientation obviously marked its structures: the smallest OUN-cell consisted of 3–5 persons (living for example in villages), 3–5 villages created the pidrayon (subdistrict), above that was the rayon (district) which usually made up the administrative unit, and then the povit (county, in Polish:

\(^{17}\) Alexander J. Motyl: The Turn to the Right…, 140.


\(^{19}\) Petro Mirchuk, idem, 88.
powiat). The rayons made up the okruh (province). Poland had 10 provinces led by the Home Executive in Western Ukrainian Lands (Krajova Egzekutyva na Zachido-ukrains’kych Zemljach, KE na ZUZ).

OUN cells existed in many countries (Czechoslovakia, Romania, Germany, Lithuania, USA, Canada), but bore the greatest influence and were best organized in Poland, which quickly became part of Ukrainian legal life by infiltrating minority society’s circulation (political parties, education, co-operative movement, etc.).

The OUN adopted terrorist methods (sabotage, killings, and repudiations) from the UVO. These methods, on the one hand, were used to mobilize Ukrainian society; and on the other to confuse occupiers and to make the administration, and the Polish citizens in East Poland feel unsafe. Furthermore, the terror reminded Ukrainians that the struggle against the occupiers was not over and that they should prepare for the final clash. It should not be forgotten that OUN members, if granted the opportunity, continued political-ideological education within the Ukrainian masses, preparing them to accept the idea of „permanent revolution” and the final reckoning with the enemy at the “appropriate moment”.

It should also be mentioned that this illegal and radical orientation became a destructive movement, and thus endangered Ukrainian minority’s achieving success in political, economical and social fields in an organic and constructive way. Although the leaders of the biggest Ukrainian party, UNDO opposed OUN’s terrorist methods, they shared the same overlying goal – to achieve an independent, national state.

A journalist for “Dilo”, the largest Ukrainian daily, Ivan Kedryn knew well both legal and illegal Ukrainian political life, and wrote in his memoirs:

“The underground revolutionary movement’s leaders […] thought that the worse is nation’s situation, the better for them, because it could lead to the revolutionizing the whole nation. It seems to me, that the most characteristic feature of the Ukrainian underground was the stronger emotional factor instead of rational. This was the logical consequence of the defeat of Ukrainian independent movement and the Polish minority policy.”

At the same time, the legalpolitical scene needed OUN’s illegal action. Kedryn stated in another article: “The Polish authorities knew well, that I – and also the most of responsible [Ukrainian] politicians – in general had

20 Alexander J. Motyl: The Turn to the Right..., 150.
a positively attitude towards existence of the revolutionary underground movement, but negatively towards OUN’s structure and methods in 1930s. [...] Once Roman Smal-Stoc’kyj, who in the eye of youth was “polonofil” mentioned to me in cafeteria in Warsaw during our often breakfasts: ‘If there wasn’t OUN, we would have to create it – but in another appearance, as it is today’”. It is worth mentioning, the organization, at first, was more radical in words than in actions. Furthermore, Polish authorities did not hinder its development, as OUN seemed to counterbalance the Ukrainian communists and to neutralize the sovietfil movement.

From July to November 1930, 191 acts of violent (arson of warehouses and cereal fields, damaging telephone cables, railways and state institutions, blowing up bridges, etc.) took place in Lwów, Tarnopol and Stanisławów viovodship where the Ukrainian minority was the majority. Burning and damaging property owned by Poles, according to the logic of the perpetrators, maintained the Ukrainians’ “revolutionary attitude” and strengthened the OUN’s position in Ukrainian society. But as a consequence, neither the Poles nor Ukrainians felt safe. Poles feared their neighbors, and Ukrainians feared the Polish authorities’ strike back. From the government’s point of view, these acts of terrorism called the international public opinion’s attention towards the Ukrainian question in Poland while disrupting the security of Polish citizens.

The authorities responded quickly. The Prime Minister, Józef Piłsudski stressed to the Minister of the Interior, Felicjan Sławoj-Składkowski to apply adequate means against the perpetrators (and their civilian supporters) while avoiding the term “uprising”. The “pacification” of Polish authorities lasted from September 16 to November 30 1930.

One thousand policeman and a few army units took part in restoring the order. According to official data, 450 Ukrainian villages, in 16 districts (powiat), were pacified. The Polish authorities arrested Ukrainian activists, made several, brutal house searches, confiscated ammunition, and dissolved some local institutions (“Sokil”, “Luh”, and co-operatives). The government

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23 Ivan Kedryn-Rudnyts’kyj: Vydatna indyvidualnist’. In Yevhen Konovalets…, 351.
held the entire Ukrainian minority in Eastern Galicia responsible for the radical nationalist’s sabotage.

The OUN’s terrorist actions, and the authorities repressive contrac-
tions showed, that there could be no constructive dialog between the Polish
government and the Ukrainian radicals. And, though the Ukrainian popula-
tion became ever more vocal, no coexistence with the regime provided even
minimum, minority rights. As a consequence of pacification, nationalists
strengthened their positions and influence in Ukrainian society.

In the aftermath of pacification, OUN members assassinated Tadeusz
Hołówko, the deputy leader of BBWR, the ruling government bloc, and the
specialist in minority issues in August 1931. Prominent OUN activists
blamed Hołówko, who at that time was working in the Ministry of Interior
as the director of the Department for Minorities, for the pacification and the
colonization of Eastern Galicia. In addition, this Polish politician wrote the
OUN hagiographist Petro Mirchuk, “poisoned the Ukrainian society’s life
with the idea of conciliation”.

This murder slowed down the reconciliation
process between the Polish government and the legal Ukrainian parties
(mainly UNDO).

A second OUN assassination occurred in Warsaw in June 1934.
Bronisław Pieracki, the Minister of the Interior, and the man then responsi-
ble for the security of Poland, was killed in broad daylight, in the heart of the
capital. A few days after the event, OUN made an official announcement
taking responsibility for the murder. They declared Pieracki the main person
responsible for organizing and executing the pacification, calling him the
“hangman of the Ukrainian nation”.

The Polish authority’s answer was quick and determined. Shortly after
Pieracki’s murder, the President, Igancy Mościcki, signed a government’s de-
cree creating an internal camp in Bereza Kartuska (Polesje voivodship).
Here, the Polish government could isolate, without trial, any person consid-
ered politically dangerous, including Ukrainian nationalists. From July 1934
to September 1939, the camp held approximately 3000 persons, 4% from

27 Petro Mirchuk, idem, 282, 284.
28 Iwan Kerdyn stressed (idem, 226 – 227), that murders were provoked by Polish circles,
which opposed Polish-Ukrainian overtures. At the same time, Marshal Piłsudski
assumed, that the murder could be on the border-line between the Ukrainian
nationalism and Bolshevik’s influence. See Kazimierz Świtalski: Diariusz 1919–1935.
29 Andrzej Ajnenckiel, 313–314.
30 Petro Mirchuk, idem, 375.
OUN. Both nationalist and communist historiography treated Bereza as a concentration camp, but the camp bore little resemblance to Soviet or Nazi concentration camps.

The minister’s assassination also led to the unprecedented arrests, detention or trial of 800 OUN-members. This repression also affected higher leadership, paralyzing the organization’s activity for a month.

The “process in Warsaw” lasted from November 1935 until January 1936, and peaked when the twelve accomplices (all OUN-members) to Pieracki’s murder came to trial (the killer managed to escape from the country). Their trials developed into a major political event receiving much internal and external publicity. The Polish government evidently wanted to abolish the minority’s radical and dangerous nationalist movement for public order. But, Ukrainians wanted to demonstrate to not only their own community, but to foreign public opinion, that truth was on their side.

In the end, three men (Stepan Bandera, Mykola Lebed’ and Jaroslav Karpynets) were sentenced to death (their sentences were later changed to life in prison), the others received life sentences but served only 7 to 15 years.

Following the Munich conference in September 1938, an autonomous region was formed on the territory of Czechoslovakia; Carpatho-Ukraine led by Msgr. Augustine Voloshyn (15 September 1938–13 March 1939). This gave hope to Ukrainians in Poland that their dream of independence could become a reality. It also motivated OUN in 397 demonstrations, 47 sabotages, and 34 terrorist actions in Eastern Galicia. The growing activity of Ukrainian nationalists was also a response to the trials of OUN-leaders in 1934, which popularized the organization. Moreover, in 1938 Stalin ordered the communist party in Poland, and thereby the Ukrainian section-KPZU, to dissolve. Consequently, with the removal of the great antagonist, the Ukrainian nationalists could move more freely.

34 Petro Mirchuk, idem, 389–396.
The May 1938 assassination of Yevhen Konovalets, in Rotterdam, however, was a big loss for the OUN. Today we know that Stalin personally ordered his death, which was carried out by a NKVD-agent. It seems the Ukrainian national movement threatened the Soviet government.\textsuperscript{36}

It is still debated; in what respect interwar Ukrainian nationalism can be treated as a Fascist movement in Europe. In the literature, three orientations are known regarding this issue. According to the first, Ukrainian nationalism had nothing in common with Fascism (authors connected to National historiography: Petro Mirchuk and Volodymyr Kosyk, share this point of view). The second orientation stresses that European Fascism strongly influenced Ukrainian Nationalism, but differed in its main objectives (John A. Armstrong, Alexander J. Motyl, and Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts’kyj in his earlier works). According to the third „school”, radical Ukrainian nationalism was part of the European Fascist movement in the interwar period (Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts’kyj, in his later works, Kost’ Bondarenko).\textsuperscript{37}

Fascism surely had some influence on Ukrainian Nationalism during the interwar period. The first person to popularize fascist ideology in Ukrainian lands was Dmytro Dontsov. According to him, only another dynamic, and nationalism-oriented ideology could compete with communism. Shortly after Adolph Hitler’s takeover in Germany, Dontsov wrote: “The most essential item for us in Hitlerism is that it wishes to make the final showdown with communism. It is significant, that such a regime was born in Europe, which has an attitude to Bolsheviks – in a Bolshevik manner.”\textsuperscript{38} It is worth mentioning, that Dontsov published, among others, Benito Mussolini’s „Doctrine of Fascism” and some fragments from Hitler’s „Mein Kampf”. Aside from this, Dontsov – as I mentioned before – gave a nationally oriented, anti-communistic and totalitarian character to Ukrainian nationalism. It is not accidental that Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts’kyj, stressed in his later article, Dontsov “with his all authority directed the Ukrainian nationalism into the channel of Fascism”.\textsuperscript{39}

Furthermore, Dontsov’s “active nationalism” differed from the “organized nationalism” represented by OUN. The former was an ideology full of emotions, but not an organized doctrine. The latter was an ideology and a political movement, which worked out an extreme program, and had a sys-


\textsuperscript{38} Citeted in Oleksander Zajtsev, ibidem, 93.

tematic Weltanschauung. At the same time, it is not sure that OUN would have been as successful if Dmytro Don’tsov had not promoted its ideology.40

It should not be forgotten, that the Ukrainian nationalists during the interwar period, with few exceptions, did not consider themselves Fascists. Integral nationalism did not simply copy or borrow from European Fascism, but Ukrainian nationalists knew the German and Italian national totalitarianism. The main difference between these ideologies as that Fascism and Nazism were born and evolved in (more or less industrialized) nation-states, while Ukrainians sought an independent state (which was the main goal of both legal and illegal Ukrainian parties in interwar Poland). So, Ukrainian integral nationalism was first of all, in Oleksander Zajtsev’s opinion, an ideology of a subjugated and stateless nation, a national-liberation movement, and only afterwards, a kind of totalitarianism.41

The OUN was founded in Vienna, but the organization was really formed in Czechoslovakia among Ukrainian (military student) émigrés. This organization could be rooted and develop wherever Ukrainian indigenous (Romania, Czechoslovakia) lived, or among emigrated populations (USA, Canada, South-America, Germany, France, etc.). It is worth underlining that OUN, in the territory of the Soviet Union did not take shape, due to the totalitarian and repression character of the Soviet state. It is difficult even to estimate the OUN’s number in Poland during the interwar period. According to the young Polish historian, Roman Wysocki, right before World War II they counted 8–9 thousand, but the members of OUN’s youth section (Yunatstvo), and the few thousand sympathizers could be added to this.42

In Poland, where the Ukrainian national minority counted as one sixth of the country’s population, the OUN found a particular breeding ground and here, the organization was most radical and dynamical. Undoubtedly, the Polish government’s policy toward the Ukrainian minority contributed to the spread and strengthening of radical Ukrainian nationalism.43 Warsaw usually did not keep its promises (autonomy for Eastern Galicia, an independent Ukrainian university in L’viv, etc.), and in several fields (education, administration) Ukrainians

40 Heorhij Kasjanov, idem, 319.
41 Oleksander Zajtsev, idem, 101–102.
were seriously discriminated against. It should not be forgotten that Poland’s political scene had changed – in 1926 a (weak and immature) parliamentary democracy was replaced by the „sanacja” regime, and following Józef Piłsudski’s death in 1935, the regime moved towards authoritarian political methods and Polish nationalism. The shoddy economic situation in interwar Poland (over-population in agricultural sector, unemployment of intelligentsia) also benefited Ukrainian nationalists. The OUN could not follow the example of the neighboring totalitarian soviet system, which – mainly in the 1920’s – seemed to be so attractive for the Ukrainian minority in Poland (korenizatsia). Stalin’s brutal policy in Ukrainian SSR in the 1930’s (man-made famine, purges, liquidation of intelligentsia), however, dispersed all such illusions. Ukrainian nationalism in Poland at the end of the interwar period could depend on neither Poland, nor the Soviet Union, as both countries strongly disagreed with an independent Ukrainian state.

At the beginning of World War II, the OUN (which split into two factions [OUN-Bandera and OUN-Melnyk] in 1940) hoped to restore Ukrainian independence with the help of Nazi Germany. Hitler had no plans for such a state. During the war, Ukrainian nationalists were struggled against both the Soviet and German army. After 1944, it fought against the communist regime in the Soviet Union (and in Poland). The small group of nationalists managed to escape to Western Europe and eventually North America. Since that time, radical Ukrainian nationalism has had no spectacular successes in emigration, or in independent Ukraine.

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